Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 590 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020)

by Amanda Hainsworth

Case Focus

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has protected employees from discrimination “because of … sex” for more than half a century. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2. Over time, Title VII has been construed to prohibit a range of different forms of sex discrimination, including sex stereotyping and sexual harassment. Yet some lower courts have stopped short of including LGBTQ workers within Title VII’s ambit, leaving LGBTQ employees in more than half of the states across the country without employment discrimination protections.

This changed in June when the Supreme Court of the United States held, in a landmark 6-3 decision, Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 590 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020), that Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination includes discrimination based on sexual orientation and transgender status. This decision is a major victory for LGBTQ people and advocates, and has significant implications that extend well beyond the employment context.

Background

The issue came to the Supreme Court in a trio of cases that raised essentially the same question: does Title VII bar employers from discriminating against a person because they are gay or transgender?

In Altitude Express, Inc., et al. v. Zarda, No. 17-1623, Donald Zarda was fired from his job as a skydiving instructor within days of mentioning to his employer that he was gay.

In R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, No. 18-107, Aimee Stephens was fired from her job after penning a letter to her employer disclosing her transgender status and intent to live and work full-time as a woman.

And in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, No. 17-1618, Gerald Bostock was fired from his job after he began participating in a gay recreational softball league.

Each of these employees brought suit under Title VII, alleging unlawful discrimination because of sex. The Second and Sixth Circuits concluded that Title VII bars employers from firing people because of their sexual orientation (as to Mr. Zarda) or their transgender status (as to Ms. Stephens). In Mr. Bostock’s case, the Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion and held that Title VII does not prohibit employers from firing employees for being gay. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split over the scope of Title VII’s protections. Sadly, Mr. Zarda and Ms. Stephens both passed away before the Supreme Court issued its decision.

The Supreme Court’s Decision in Bostock

In Bostock, the Court unequivocally held that an employer who fires an individual for being gay or transgender violates Title VII. This is because, in firing a person for being gay or transgender, the employer has fired that person “for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex,” which is exactly what Title VII prohibits. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.

The Court relied heavily on the plain meaning of “because of . . . sex” at the time that Title VII was enacted. It proceeded on the assumption that, in 1964, “sex” signified male or female, and concluded that “because of” incorporated a traditional “but-for” causation standard, which the Court explained, “directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes.” Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739. Thus, an employer violates Title VII “if changing the employee’s sex would have yielded a different choice by the employer.” Id. at 1741. And, because “it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex,” employers who do so are in violation of Title VII. Id.

To illustrate the point as to sexual orientation, the Court offered an example of an employer with two employees—one male and one female—both of whom are attracted to men and otherwise identical in all material respects. If the employer fired the male employee because he is attracted to men, but retained the female employee who is also attracted to men, then the employer has violated Title VII because the male employee’s sex was a necessary part of the termination decision.

To illustrate the point as to transgender status, the Court provided another example of an employer who fired a transgender woman because she was assigned male at birth. In this scenario, “[i]f the employer retains an otherwise identical employee who was identified as female at birth, the employer intentionally penalizes a person identified as male at birth for traits or actions that it tolerates in an employee identified as female at birth.” Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741.  Here again, the employee’s sex was a necessary and impermissible part of the termination decision.

The Court rejected the employers’ argument that Congress did not intend Title VII to reach discrimination against LGBTQ people in 1964 when it enacted the statute. In doing so, the Court pointed out that there is no such thing as a “canon of donut holes” where Congress’ failure to directly address a specific circumstance that falls within a more general statutory rule creates an implicit exception to that general rule. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1746-47. Instead, Title VII prohibits all forms of sex discrimination, however such discrimination might manifest and regardless of how else the discrimination might be characterized.

The Court also rejected the argument that Congress’ failure to pass amendments to expressly include sexual orientation and transgender status should be relevant to the Court’s interpretation of the statute. The Court noted that “speculation about why a later Congress declined to adopt new legislation offers a ‘particularly dangerous’ basis on which to rest an interpretation of an existing law a different and earlier Congress did adopt.” Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1747.

Finally, the Court rejected the employers’ argument that “sex” should be construed narrowly because of the “no-elephants-and-mouseholes canon” which “recognizes that Congress does not alter fundamental details of a regulatory scheme by speaking in vague or ancillary terms.” Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753 (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)). While the Court agreed that the Bostock holding is certainly an elephant, it rejected the idea that Title VII—a major federal civil rights law that is “written in starkly broad terms” and has “repeatedly produced unexpected applications”—is a mousehole. Id. Instead, the Court concluded, “[t]his elephant has never hidden in a mousehole; it has been standing before us all along.” Id.

Implications

The potential implications of the Bostock decision are sweeping.

The largest and most obvious implication is that LGBTQ people now have nationwide protection against discrimination by any employer covered by Title VII (i.e., any employer with fifteen or more employees). Although Massachusetts’s nondiscrimination law has protected LGBTQ people from employment discrimination for years, see G.L. ch. 151B, § 4, Bostock represents a sea change for those states without any employment discrimination protections for LGBTQ people. Employers in those states now need to, among other steps, review and update policies and procedures and employee benefits packages to ensure compliance.

More broadly, while the Court’s holding was limited to Title VII, Bostock may mean that other federal civil rights statutes that prohibit sex discrimination also prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and transgender status. This is because courts routinely rely on rulings in Title VII cases to inform rulings in cases involving other civil rights laws with comparable prohibitions on sex discrimination. There are more than 100 different federal laws that prohibit sex discrimination in a wide variety of different contexts, including in education, credit, housing, healthcare, and military service. Bostock means that all of those laws may also protect LGBTQ people. Bostock also calls into question the legality of the Trump Administration’s efforts to roll back federal civil rights protections for LGBTQ people in areas such as education and school athletics (Title IX), the military, and the Affordable Care Act.

Beyond these implications, there will almost certainly be a great deal of litigation related to the interplay between federal civil rights laws and employers’ religious beliefs.  Title VII contains a narrow exception for discrimination on account of religion, but the Court did not address the extent to which employers will be permitted to discriminate against LGBTQ people based on religious beliefs.

Bostock also has potential implications for the standard of review that should be applied to federal equal protection claims involving discrimination against LGBTQ people.  Rational basis review has been applied to such claims since the Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). But sex-based classifications have long been subject to intermediate scrutiny, and Bostock’s holding that discrimination against LGBTQ people is, at core, sex discrimination suggests that intermediate scrutiny should be applied to such claims moving forward.

And, finally, but perhaps most importantly, Bostock may help shine a light toward a world where LGBTQ people—and in particular Black and brown transgender people—can begin to live freely and openly, with a little less fear and a little less pain, and a little more opportunity to succeed and thrive.

*This article represents the opinions and legal conclusions of its author(s) and not necessarily those of the Office of the Attorney General.  Opinions of the Attorney General are formal documents rendered pursuant to specific statutory authority.

 

Amanda Hainsworth is an Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Rights Division of the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office.


Avoiding Immigration-Related Employment Discrimination: Tips for Employers

By Anjali Waikar

Practice Tips

Waikar_AnjaliAs the national debate concerning immigration reform continues, the federal government has turned its attention to cracking down on employers who hire unauthorized workers.  Such efforts were highlighted in the federal immigration raid of the Michael Bianco, Inc. factory in New Bedford in 2007, where nearly 350 individuals were rounded up and placed in deportation proceedings.  The company ultimately pled guilty to 22 counts relating to the hiring of unauthorized workers and paid a $1.5 million fine.  To respond to such increased scrutiny, the government has offered employers various tools to check employees’ work authorization.  For example, the Town of Milford recently became the first municipality in New England to sign up for IMAGE, a federal program providing employers with education and training on hiring procedures, fraudulent document protection, and use of employment screening tools like E-Verify that allows employers to check an applicant’s work eligibility.

Illegal immigration is fueled by job opportunities.  Accordingly, many well-intentioned employers, in the face of increasing scrutiny, are concerned about what they can and should be doing to ensure they are not violating federal immigration laws by hiring unauthorized workers.  There are myriad considerations employers face, including how to correctly fill out the I-9 Form, how to respond to Social Security “no match” letters, and whether to enroll in E-Verify, to name a few.  What, then, are some of an employer’s obligations with respect to ensuring that it is not employing unauthorized workers?  What risks does an employer face by terminating an employee whom the employer believes has submitted false documents?  What are best practices an employer may follow to avoid immigration-related employment discrimination?  This article provides an introduction to these issues and practical tips for lawyers who advise employers that are seeking to comply with the law without running afoul of immigration-related antidiscrimination laws.

Immigration Laws in the Workplace

The federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) prohibits knowingly hiring undocumented workers and imposes affirmative obligations on employers to verify a new employee’s identity and work authorization.  IRCA also prohibits employers from discriminating against employees who look or sound “foreign.”  IRCA prohibits national origin discrimination against all work-authorized individuals in hiring, recruitment, referrals and discharge practices, as well as discrimination based on citizenship status for certain categories of workers, unless such discrimination is otherwise required by law or government contract.  The antidiscrimination provisions of IRCA apply to all employers with at least four employees.  In addition, employers are subject to the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights act of 1964 as well as Massachusetts’ antidiscrimination laws, particularly General Laws Chapter 151B.

To enforce its antidiscrimination provisions, IRCA created the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices (OSC), located within the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice.  It is the only governmental office specifically designed and empowered to protect the civil rights of immigrant workers.

In 2000, OSC and the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination entered into a memorandum of agreement whereby each entity would support the other’s missions and notify complainants of their right, if applicable, to file a complaint with the other agency.  See  http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/osc/pdf/Massachusetts.pdf.  Accordingly, for the purpose of satisfying the statute of limitations, complaints under IRCA may also be filed with the MCAD.  Since 2006, OCS has issued at least ten letters of resolution to Massachusetts employers, either concluding independent investigations or memorializing voluntary settlement agreements with the charging parties.  For example, on January 31, 2012, OSC issued a letter of resolution resolving an investigation into allegations that a Massachusetts company discriminated on the basis of national origin by demanding that a lawful permanent resident present a green card.  The resolution included full back pay of $900 and company training on the antidiscrimination provisions of  IRCA.

Tips for Avoiding Immigration-Related Discrimination

With this background, lawyers should be aware of the following tips for avoiding immigration-related employment discrimination:

Citizenship Requirements.  Employers may violate IRCA, as well as Title VII based on national origin discrimination, by imposing citizenship requirements or giving preference to U.S. citizens, in the absence of a legal requirement to do so (e.g., pursuant to law or government contract).

I-9 Form.  The I-9 Form is required of all employees upon hire, regardless of the employee’s national origin or citizenship.  Employees are required to present documentation to their employers to establish both identity and employment eligibility.  Failing to verify new employees’ identity and employment eligibility by completing the I-9 Form violates federal immigration law.  The I-9 Form provides for several combinations of legally acceptable documents.  Employers should maintain consistent procedures relating to I-9 Forms or face potential discrimination claims under IRCA.  For example, employers should not:

  • Request more or different documents than the I-9 Form requires to validate a candidate’s legal status, as doing so may violate IRCA.  Likewise, employers must not selectively request proof of permanent residency or other work authorization from an applicant based on his or her national origin.  Instead, employers should ask all applicants for acceptable documents indicated on List A or B and C on the I-9 Form;
  • Reject government-issued documents that reasonably appear to be genuine and to relate to the employee presenting them.  However, if the document does not reasonably appear to be genuine or to relate to the individual, the employer may ask the employee for additional documentation and should not employ the person if he or she is unable to comply.

Timing.  Employers who ask to see a job candidate’s documents before making a hiring decision may face discrimination claims if the candidate is not offered the job.  Instead, employers should request proof of work authorization after making a contingent offer of employment.

Expiring Documents.  Employers must not refuse to hire a qualified worker whose employment authorization expires in the future.  Instead, employers must complete the hire with the understanding that the employee must provide evidence of continuing employment authorization before the document’s expiration date.

Re-verification of Current Employees.  Employers must not require an employee to “re-verify” his/her employment eligibility after s/he has already done so.  Employers are also prohibited from re-verifying employment eligibility in many other situations, such as when a worker returns from approved leave or is reinstated after an unlawful suspension or termination.  See 8 C.F.R. 274a.2(b)(1)(viii)(A).  Only in limited circumstances may an employer require “re-verification,” such as when an employment authorization document presented has expired or is about to expire or when the employer has “constructive knowledge” that the worker is not authorized.  An employer has “constructive knowledge” – and thus a duty to investigate – where it has knowledge that would lead a reasonable person to believe that an individual is not authorized to work in the United States, such as when ICE notifies the employer that the employee may have presented false documents.

Contacting Federal Authorities.  Some employers may be tempted to contact federal authorities to “verify” a worker’s work eligibility or social security number.  Because such a “verification” effort is likely to be ineffective due to extensive inaccuracies in the information maintained by the federal government, employers should accept documents that reasonably appear to be genuine and to relate to the employee presenting them.  Further, employers should not routinely investigate documents without reason to believe such documents are false.

Conclusion

The antidiscrimination provisions of IRCA prohibit unfair, immigration-related employment practices.  It is possible to comply with the federal laws governing employment verification without triggering exposure to claims of discrimination.  Employers should be advised to treat all employees consistently regardless of citizenship status or national origin and to create and implement uniform policies and procedures relating to employment verification in order to avoid claims of immigration-related discrimination.

Anjali Waikar is an associate at Krokidas & Bluestein advising nonprofit, health care, and social service organizations and individuals on employment, privacy, and health care law.