Look no Further! The Scope of Consent Searches After Commonwealth v. Ortiz

Langsam

by Jessica Langsam

Case Focus

In Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 478 Mass. 820 (2018), a closely-divided Supreme Judicial Court held that, under the Fourth Amendment and article 14 of the Declaration of Rights, a suspect’s consent to search for weapons or drugs “in the vehicle” does not include consent to search under the hood (and under a removed air filter) unless it is “reasonably clear” to a “typical reasonable person” that consent extends beyond the interior of the vehicle and the trunk. Id. at 826-27. The case turned on the scope of the suspect’s consent and the application of the settled rule that “[t]he standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment [and article 14] is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness — what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” Id. at 824 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)). Ortiz considered “the words spoken” in the exchange to be informed only by “the context” as it existed during that time, id., a narrower period than in previous cases and one that excludes a suspect’s lack of objection when his consent to the scope of the search is deemed ambiguous.

Background

An officer stopped the defendant’s car and asked if there was anything “in the vehicle that the police should know about, including narcotics or firearms.” Ortiz, 478 Mass. at 821. The defendant replied, “No, you can check.” Id. He exited the vehicle at an officer’s request and was then handcuffed. Id. at 821-822. A drug-detection dog walked around the vehicle but did not alert. Id. at 822. Officers searched the vehicle’s interior but found no contraband. Id. They then raised the hood, removed the air filter, and found a bag containing firearms. Id. The defendant watched from the side of the road but did not object. Id. He was arrested and subsequently told officers that the firearms belonged to him and that he had given consent to look in his vehicle. Id.

The defendant sought to suppress the firearms and his statements on the ground that the search unconstitutionally exceeded the scope of his consent. Id. After an evidentiary hearing, the court suppressed the evidence, ruling that although the defendant’s consent was free and voluntary, when the officer asked only about items “in the vehicle,” a typical reasonable person would understand the scope to have been limited to the interior, and the scope of the defendant’s consent was not expanded by his lack of objection during the search. Id. at 822-823.

The Majority Opinion

In this 4-3 decision, the SJC affirmed suppression, concluding that the defendant’s consent was limited to a search of the vehicle’s interior, which included, the Court said, the passenger compartment and the trunk. The majority cited a similar conclusion by the Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Troxell, 78 S.W.3d 866 (Tenn. 2002). Ortiz, 478 Mass. at 824. There, an officer asked the driver of a pickup truck whether he had “any weapons in the vehicle”; the driver replied “no, nothing”; the officer asked, “Okay if we take a look?”; and the driver answered, “Yeah, go ahead.” Id. (emphasis in original). As the SJC noted, Troxell concluded that “[t]he verbal exchange therefore expressly indicated” that the officer intended to search “in the vehicle” (i.e., the cab) and that it was therefore “objectively reasonable to conclude that the consent to search included only the interior.” Id. (quoting Troxell, 78 S.W.3d at 872).

In essentially an alternative ruling, the majority stated that as a matter of fairness, the scope of consent, like voluntariness, must be unambiguous and that the scope of consent here was ambiguous and suppression was warranted because the police may not take advantage of an ambiguity that could be resolved with a clarifying question. Id. at 825-826. The Court held that “unless it is reasonably clear that the consent to search extends beyond the interior of the vehicle, the police must obtain explicit consent before a vehicular search may extend beneath the hood.” Id. at 826-827. It held that where, as here, the scope of consent to search was not reasonably clear, the defendant’s silence when the search extended to the hood was not a substitute for consent but was rather “mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority” and his failure to revoke consent was not an agreement to expand the scope beyond its initial limit. Id. at 827.

The Dissent

The dissent would have reversed suppression, noting that to apply the standard interpreting a suspect’s consent to search required considering not only the exchange itself but also the “facts and circumstances surrounding” it, including whether the defendant limited the scope, and, as stated in Jimeno, the “expressed object” of the search. Id. at 827-28. Concluding that the defendant did not limit consent to the interior and trunk, the dissent pointed to his “unqualified and unambiguous general consent” in response to the officer’s request to search for “any narcotics or firearms in the vehicle” and his lack of objection when officers looked under the hood, which would indicate to a “typical reasonable person” that he “authorized the entire search.” Id. at 828.

The dissent noted that whereas Troxell concluded that “in the vehicle” referred to the pickup’s cab, the Ortiz majority concluded that “in the vehicle” referred to the cab plus the trunk – and that there was no “meaningful difference” between the trunk and the hood because both were beyond the passenger compartment and opened separately. Id. at 828-29. The dissent also noted that Troxell’s “narrow focus on the colloquial use” of “in” ignored the conversation’s subject matter, and that Troxell’s search was more extensive in kind and duration and included a drug detection dog, an officer’s examination of the vehicle’s underside and gas tank, and removal of the gas tank at a service station (to which the defendant was instructed to drive), where drugs were found. Id. at 829. In contrast, the dissent found no ambiguity in the defendant’s consent to the scope of the search and noted that his failure to object when the search moved to the hood further evidenced his initial authorization for that portion of the search. Id. at 830.

Consent Searches Post-Ortiz

Cases prior to Ortiz considered a broader context to ascertain the scope of a suspect’s consent, including whether the defendant objected. In Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 443 Mass. 245, 255 (2005), cited by the Ortiz majority and dissent, the defendant argued that the scope of his consent was limited by what officers told him, which was that they wanted to test his blood and compare the results with results of testing connected to one victim. Id. However, the Gaynor Court held that a reasonable person likely would have concluded that the police were seeking the defendant’s blood test results, including his DNA profile, that the scope was not limited to the current investigation (there were additional victims), and that the defendant never limited the scope. Id. at 255-56. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Caputo, 439 Mass. 153, 163 (2003) (holding that when defendant invited officers inside residence and then said that he did not want to talk with them, but did not ask them to leave and did not object when two officers reentered after inspecting his car, invitation to enter was not circumscribed). By way of explanation for limiting the context to only the exchange between the suspect and police, the majority noted that the law is already “quite protective of law enforcement” in that consent may be found valid even when the suspect was not informed of and was unaware of his right to refuse. Ortiz, 478 Mass. at 826.

Going forward, police who want to search a suspect’s vehicle should choose their words carefully and obtain explicit consent for a search beyond the vehicle’s passenger compartment and trunk. A suspect’s consent will likely not be held to be any broader than the plain language of that exchange and could turn, as it did here, on what the meaning of “in” is.

Jessica Langsam is Senior Appellate Counsel at the Middlesex District Attorney’s Office.  She has litigated motions to suppress and cases at trial and has argued before the Appeals Court and the Supreme Judicial Court.  This article represents the opinions and legal conclusions of its author and not necessarily those of the Middlesex District Attorney’s Office.


Massachusetts Adopts “Red Flag” Law

Stevens

by Bethany Stevens

Heads Up

Massachusetts law has long provided two tools to suspend a person’s lawful access to firearms:  a firearms licensing authority could suspend a person’s license to carry or possess a firearm if it found the person was unsuitable, or a court could — indeed, is required to — suspend a firearms license and order the surrender of the person’s firearms after finding a substantial likelihood of an immediate danger of abuse of a household or family member pursuant to G.L. c. 209A.  Massachusetts has now added a third tool, modeled after “red flag” laws in other states, to allow seizure of the firearms of persons who present a risk to themselves or others.  As of August 17, 2018, the District Court and Boston Municipal Court may now issue an “extreme risk protection order” to compel a person to immediately surrender firearms and ammunition on the petition of a household member, family member or licensing authority without the need for a finding of abuse.  See G.L. c. 140, §§ 131R-131Z.

What is an Extreme Risk Protection Order?

An extreme risk protection order (sometimes referred to as an “ERPO”) immediately suspends a person’s license to carry or possess a firearm and directs the person to immediately surrender their firearms licenses, guns (including stun guns), and ammunition to the licensing authority in the municipality where the person resides.  An ERPO may issue only upon a finding that the person “poses a risk of bodily injury to self or others by being in possession of a [firearms license] or having in his control, ownership or possession [guns or ammunition].”  G.L. c. 140, § 131T(a). While the order is in effect, the respondent is disqualified from obtaining a firearms license and is prohibited from possessing a firearms license, gun or ammunition.  A violation of the order is a misdemeanor criminal offense.

Who Can Seek an Order?

The new law allows a household or family member, defined as those phrases are used in G.L. c. 209A, to file a petition with the court upon “belie[f] that a person holding a license to carry firearms or a firearm identification card may pose a risk of causing bodily injury to self or others.”  G.L. c. 140, § 131R.  A petition may also be filed by the licensing authority where the respondent resides (defined as “the chief of police or the board or officer having control of the police in a city or town, or persons authorized by them,” G.L. c. 140, § 121).  In some instances, the licensing authority where the respondent resides will not be the authority that actually issued the respondent’s firearms license(s) because a person could be licensed by the police department of the municipality in which the person works or because a person might move to a different municipality after licensing.  G.L. c. 140, §§ 129B(1), 129B(11),  and 131(d).

Individuals who are not family or household members may not petition a court for an ERPO, even though in appropriate instances they may seek a harassment protection order under G.L. c. 258E.  Chapter 258E does not authorize a harassment prevention order to include an order to surrender firearms.  J.C. v. J.H., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 224, 230 (2017).  As a result, if an individual who is not a member of a license-holder’s family or household believes that a license-holder poses a risk to themselves or others, the individual should seek appropriate relief by reporting the information to an eligible ERPO petitioner.

Procedure to Issue an Order

The new law bears many procedural similarities to G.L. c. 209A.  A petitioner who seeks an ERPO must file a petition signed under the pains and penalties of perjury.  If on review the judge “finds reasonable cause to conclude that the respondent poses a risk of bodily injury to self or others” by possessing a firearms license, guns or ammunition, the judge may issue an emergency or temporary extreme risk protection order without first giving notice to the respondent.  G.L. c. 140, § 131T(a).  An emergency order issued during court hours is valid for only 10 days.  Like an emergency order under c. 209A, an emergency ERPO issued after court hours by an on-call judge is valid only until the end of the next court day.  If a petitioner seeks to have such an “after hours” emergency order extended beyond the next court day, the petitioner must appear during court hours for a hearing at the appropriate court with jurisdiction over the city or town where the respondent lives.

Because an ERPO suspends a person’s lawful access to guns and ammunition, an ERPO will not issue when the person has no license to suspend. Rather than issuing an ERPO, the court will provide the information to police to take whatever action is warranted when they learn information related to the illegal possession of firearms. If in these circumstances the petitioner is a household or family member concerned about their own safety, they should consider seeking a c. 209A order.

For an ERPO to be extended up to one year, the court must hold a hearing within ten days of the filing of the petition with notice to the respondent at least seven days prior to the hearing. The respondent can waive this notice period.  If the respondent files an affidavit stating that guns are required in the performance of the respondent’s employment, the hearing must be held within two days of the petition being filed. At the hearing, the petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent poses a risk of bodily injury to self or others by possessing guns or ammunition. If the judge so finds, the judge must issue an order for up to one year.  Either party may move to modify, suspend or terminate an active order.  Appeals of ERPO proceedings may be taken to the Appeals Court just as c. 209A orders may be appealed.

Effect of an Order

Whenever a court issues an ERPO, the licensing authority and the criminal justice information service database (CJIS) must be notified.  This triggers suspension of any Massachusetts firearms license and disqualifies the respondent from obtaining a new firearms license in Massachusetts.  This is the same process that occurs when a c. 209A order issues:  CJIS and licensing authorities are notified of c. 209A orders as such orders generally require immediate suspension of a firearms license and surrender of guns and ammunition.  G.L. c. 209A, §§ 3B and 3C.

The new statute allowing courts to issue extreme risk protection orders does not replace a licensing authority’s ability to suspend a firearms license.  Therefore, under G.L. c. 140, § 129B (firearm identification cards) or § 131 (licenses to carry), the chief of police who issued the license or their designee may still suspend a person’s license and require surrender of guns and ammunition upon finding the licensee “unsuitable.” This determination by the licensing authority results in immediate suspension of the firearms license without the need for a court ruling.

Restoration of Firearms License

While issuing an extreme risk protection order is a process separate from the licensing authority’s determination of suitability, the two processes converge upon an ERPO’s expiration or termination.   After an ERPO is issued, a firearms license, guns, and ammunition may be returned to the respondent only after the licensing authority where the respondent resides determines that the respondent is suitable. A determination of unsuitability must be based either on reliable information that the person “has exhibited or engaged in behavior to suggest the [person] could potentially create a risk to public safety” or on “existing factors that suggest that the [person] could potentially create a risk to public safety.”  G.L. c. 140, § 129B(1½)(d) . If denied reinstatement, a respondent presumably could seek judicial review under existing license appeal procedures, although the new statute does not explicitly provide for such judicial review.

Reports on the New Law’s Use

By December 31, 2018, we will learn more about the utility of this new law.  The court must provide an annual statistical report on its use, including the number of petitions filed, petitions granted, and petitions that led to surrender of guns, as well as demographic information about respondents and petitioners.  In the meantime, information about extreme risk protection orders and the forms a petitioner is required to file can be found on the court’s website. 

Bethany Stevens is the Director of Legal Policy and Deputy General Counsel to the Administrative Office of the District Court, and is a member of the BBA’s Criminal Law Section Steering Committee. Previously, she served as the Deputy Chief of the Middlesex District Attorney’s Appeals Bureau where she litigated closed courtroom claims at the trial level as well as at the Appeals Court and Supreme Judicial Court.


Reflections on the Supreme Judicial Court Committee on Grand Jury Proceedings

Ullmann

by Hon. Robert L. Ullmann

Voice of the Judiciary

Advising the Commonwealth’s highest court about an institution older than the Massachusetts Constitution, and one that operates in secrecy, was the daunting mandate given to the 14 members of the Supreme Judicial Court Committee on Grand Jury Proceedings (“SJC Grand Jury Committee”).

The Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) appointed us last year to gather information about how prosecutors present evidence to and instruct grand juries, and to seek to identify “best practices” for grand jury presentments.

Not surprisingly, given the committee’s composition of prosecutors, defense attorneys, sitting and retired judges, and one law professor, the search for best practices involved extensive and at times passionate debate.  Perhaps surprisingly, the committee was able to reach consensus on a significant number of best practices in six core areas of grand jury activity, with extensive input from the bar, in particular the Commonwealth’s prosecutors’ offices.

The committee’s Final Report, issued in June, is available on the Supreme Judicial Court website.

Grand juries hear and view evidence presented by prosecutors and decide whether probable cause exists to return indictments on felony charges.  Like trial jurors, grand jurors are chosen from randomly selected groups of citizens (venires) summoned to courthouses in each county.  Unlike trial court proceedings, however, judges and defense lawyers are not present for grand jury proceedings, and a grand jury witness’s lawyer may be present solely to advise the witness.  The judicial branch oversees the grand jury, but prosecutors run the grand jury’s day-to-day activities.

In identifying best practices, the committee recognized that grand jury presentment is a prosecution function that the SJC has described as subject to “limited judicial review.” Commonwealth v. Noble, 429 Mass. 44, 48 (1999).  However, committee members also recognized that the grand jury is “an integral part of the court,” and that judges have a “duty to prevent interference with [grand jurors] in the performance of their proper functions, to give them appropriate instructions, and to assist them in the performance of their duties.”  In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 613 (1971).

The best practices address issues such as what to do when grand jury subpoenas yield evidence that the prosecutor deems too inflammatory to present to the grand jury; when grand jurors should be instructed on defenses to the crime or on lesser included offenses or other less serious charges than the most serious potential charge; what warnings should be given to targets of investigations; and when and how grand jurors should be instructed on the law.

All of the recommended best practices are currently employed by one or more prosecutors’ offices, demonstrating that the state’s prosecutors were already taking the initiative in exploring practices to ensure that grand jurors are adequately instructed and that the integrity of grand jury presentments is not impaired.  The recommended best practices were selected because they assist grand juries in performing their dual functions of determining probable cause to charge someone with a crime and protecting persons from unfounded criminal prosecution.  All of the recommendations are fully consistent with existing SJC and Appeals Court law.

Creation of the committee and its work

The committee arose from the SJC’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Grassie, 476 Mass. 202 (2017), in which the Court stated that it would convene a committee on grand jury practices before considering an extension to adults of the rule adopted for juveniles in Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808 (2012).  In Walczak, the Court required prosecutors to provide certain legal instructions to grand jurors when prosecutors seek to indict a juvenile for murder and substantial evidence of mitigating circumstances or defenses exists.

Although the committee arose out of one court decision, the SJC did not limit the scope of the committee’s fact-gathering and asked the committee to recommend best practices in any area of grand jury practice it wished to consider.  This broad mandate raised concerns among many of the Commonwealth’s elected prosecutors.

When the committee sought public comment on a draft of its proposed best practices in March, a considerable number of district attorneys criticized the proposals as an unconstitutional intrusion by the judiciary into the exclusive role of the executive branch in making charging decisions.  A few district attorneys also saw the proposed best practices as an attempt to impose on them “one size fits all” practices similar to federal grand jury requirements.  In addition to raising these broad concerns, the district attorneys offered detailed critiques of specific proposals.  The committee also received comments from the Committee for Public Counsel Services, the Boston Bar Association, and several individuals.   The committee carefully reviewed all and adopted many of these comments, resulting in an improved set of best practices and commentary which were submitted to the SJC in June.

The committee also considered the broader concerns raised by district attorneys but ultimately concluded that recommending best practices on the presentation of evidence and instructions to grand juries fell squarely within the SJC’s charge to the committee.  Moreover, given the judiciary’s role in ensuring the integrity of grand jury proceedings, the committee believed that recommending best practices from existing prosecutors’ office practices did not violate the separation of powers, intrude upon prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions, or impose a “federalized” one-size-fits-all approach to grand jury practice.

Personal Reflections

Having served on criminal law reform committees for over three decades, I was deeply gratified to see experienced prosecutors and defense attorneys (and the rest of us) forcefully express opposing views, but carefully listen to each other and put aside parochial concerns to reach principled compromise.  There is a nationwide trend toward prosecutor best practices, but the practices typically cover areas other than the grand jury, and non-prosecutors are rarely involved in the process.  Because our committee had representation among a range of participants in the criminal justice process, the practices that we unanimously viewed as exemplary should have added credibility.

Our committee had no authority to require the implementation of best practices, and the Final Report explicitly states that it is “not intended to give substantive or procedural rights to people accused or convicted of crimes or to serve as the basis for motions to dismiss indictments.”  Over time, courts may look to the best practices we identified to render legal decisions, but that was not the purpose of our work.  I believe that I speak for the entire committee in expressing the hope that the Commonwealth’s prosecutors on their own initiative will recognize what is exemplary among practices already in use, broadly adopt those practices, and continue the process of developing new best practices in the future.

Robert L. Ullmann has been an Associate Justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court since 2013.  He was chair of the Supreme Judicial Court Committee on Grand Jury Proceedings.

In addition to the author, the other committee members were Hon. Peter W. Agnes, Jr., Appeals Court; Janice Bassil, Esq; Berkshire District Attorney Paul J. Caccaviello ; Hon. Judd J. Carhart, Appeals Court (retired); Assistant Attorney General David E. Clayton; Middlesex Assistant District Attorney Kevin J. Curtin; Deputy Chief Counsel Randy Gioia, Esq., Committee for Public Counsel Services; Hon. Bertha Josephson, Superior Court (retired); Clinical Professor Diane S. Juliar, Suffolk University Law School; Bristol District Attorney Mary E. Lee, Kevin M. Mitchell, Esq.; and Suffolk Assistant District Attorney Donna Jalbert Patalano (prior to her departure from the district attorney’s office.)  Maureen McGee, Esq. was counsel to the committee.


Major Changes to Superior Court Motion Practice

Fuller

by Victoria Fuller

Practice Tips

Superior Court Rule 9A was amended effective November 1, 2018.  Although the Rule has been amended several times in the last few years, the most recent changes are big.  Really big.  Everything from cross-motions to summary judgment to basic formatting have been revised.  Superior Court practitioners who fail to familiarize themselves with these changes risk having motions returned or denied.

Summary Judgment Packages Get Leaner

The biggest change to Rule 9A affects summary judgment procedure.  These changes are geared to slimming down filings and simplifying the issues before the Court.  First, the Statement of Facts, as served, cannot exceed 20 pages, and cannot include several types of facts:

  1. Immaterial Background facts;
  2. Quotations from, or characterizations of, transactional documents (“except if admissible through percipient witnesses”); and
  3. Quotations from statutes, regulations or rules.

Parties may submit these types of material, without argument or commentary, in an addendum to the party’s memorandum.

Second, the rule limits the permissible scope of responses to the Statement of Facts by prohibiting some common responses that have complicated the Court’s ability to determine what facts are actually disputed in good faith.  Opposing parties may state whether a fact is disputed, and if so, cite supporting record evidence.  They may not, however:

  1. Deny a fact, or state that a fact is not supported by the cited materials, without a good faith basis;
  2. Comment on whether the fact is relevant or material. The opposing party may, however, state that the fact is admitted solely for purposes of summary judgment;
  3. Assert additional facts; or
  4. Include legal argument or advocacy concerning the sufficiency, relevance or materiality of the fact.

Third, opposing parties are no longer permitted to serve Statements of Additional Facts, except in support of a cross-motion for summary judgment.  They may, however, include additional facts in their opposition with supporting record citations.  The rule also directs the parties to cite both the joint appendix exhibit number and the corresponding paragraph in the Statement of Facts in their memoranda.

In addition, three types of summary judgment motions may now be denied by the Court on the papers:

  1. Multiple motions made by the same party, or a motion filed by a party sharing similar interests with a party who has already moved for summary judgment, which raises issues previously resolved by the Court;
  2. Motions for partial summary judgment that will save little to no trial time, will not simplify trial, or will not promote resolution of the case; and
  3. Motions where a genuine dispute of material fact is obvious.

Finally, the rule has updated sanctions for non-compliance with the summary judgment provisions.  The court may not consider the motion or opposition, may return the submission to counsel with instructions for re-filing, or may impose other sanctions for flagrant violations.

Cross-Motions Are Integrated Into a Single Filing Package

The rule has now filled a procedural gap affecting cross-motions.  For example, if a party serves a motion to compel, and the opposing party serves an opposition and a cross-motion for protective order: Under the old rule, the cross-motion was not required to be included in the same 9A package.  As a consequence, the motion to compel could be filed and heard before briefing on the cross motion was complete.

Under the new rule, opposing parties serve cross-motions with their opposition to the original motion.  The original moving party then serves the reply (if any) and opposition to the cross-motion.  The original moving party files both motions and oppositions as part of the same 9A package.

Cross-motions for summary judgment generally follow the same process, but in addition, a Consolidated Statement of Facts is prepared.

Parties Must Now Confer on Dispositive Motions

The new Rules 9A and 9C extend meet and confer obligations to dispositive motions (with limited exceptions).  Motions lacking a 9C certificate under the new rule, as under the old, will be denied without prejudice.

New Procedure for Requesting Leave

Parties must still seek leave to file additional briefing and pages, which will be granted only in “exceptional circumstances.”

Rule 9A(a)(6) also sets forth a new procedure for requesting leave.  Letter requests are gone.  Now, requests must be captioned as a pleading, not exceed one page, state the grounds for the relief sought, and include a certificate of service.  The request is sent to the session clerk, captioned “ATTN: Session Judge.”  If the Court grants a request for additional pages, this will apply to the opposing party’s memorandum as well, unless otherwise ordered. The permitted pleading must state the date on which leave was allowed.  Note that a request for leave does not extend the date for filing the Rule 9A package, unless permitted by Court or by agreement of the parties.

Formatting Changes

Under the old rule, papers had to be typed in “no less than 12-point type.”  Now, papers must be 12-point type – no more, no less.  In addition, quotes and footnotes must also be 12-point type. An addendum that sets forth “verbatim and without argument, pertinent excerpts from key documents, statutes, regulations or the like” need not be included in counting permitted pages.

Finally, email addresses must be included in the signature block or the attorney must certify that he or she lacks one.

Service on Non-Parties Now Required In Limited Circumstances

Unless excused by court order, or where ex parte relief is authorized by statute or rule, the new rule requires service on non-parties under three circumstances:

  1. the motion seeks to add the non-party as a party to the case;
  2. the motion seeks an order or other relief against the non-party; or
  3. the motion addresses issues which affect the personal information or other interests of the non-party.

Electronic Service Now Permitted

Many practitioners will rejoice that email service is now permitted.  The parties must agree in writing, and parties must include “served via email” on their filings for the clerk to accept scanned signatures.  That said, parties filing papers signed under the penalties of perjury, such as affidavits, and all required 9A certifications, must bear original signatures.

Motions Exempt from Rule 9A

Finally, the new Rule 9A adds two categories of motions as exempt: motions governed by e-filing rules, and review of decisions of administrative agencies.

The new rule also seeks to prevent parties from trying to skirt Rule 9A by declaring a motion an “emergency.”  Now, parties filing emergency motions must certify that they have made a good faith effort to confer with all parties, and must state whether any party assents to or opposes the motion.

*******

Though extensive, these changes should streamline and improve Superior Court motion practice.  Prudent practitioners will ensure that they, and other attorneys in their firm or organization, familiarize themselves, and comply, with the new rule.

R. Victoria Fuller is an attorney in the Boston office of White and Williams LLP.  Her practice focuses on insurance law, employment law, and general commercial litigation.


Massachusetts High Court Rules Judges Can Require Sobriety as Part of Probation in Commonwealth v. Eldred

CoakleyHutchinson

by Martha Coakley and Rachel Hutchinson

Case Focus

On July 16, 2018, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court unanimously ruled in Commonwealth v. Eldred, 480 Mass. 90 (2018) that judges can require individuals with substance use disorders to remain drug-free as a condition of probation.  Although the Court stressed that judges should consider the challenges of addiction, the Court nevertheless found that judges must also “have the authority to detain a defendant” who has violated probation by using drugs.  Id. at 99.  It appears that the SJC is the first state supreme court to reach and decide this issue.

I. The Addiction Debate

Remaining drug-free is an almost universal requirement of probation.  Many courts, including specialty courts such as drug courts that take a public health approach to substance abuse, require offenders to stay clean, and respond to relapses with sanctions ranging from warnings to jail time.  But as the opioid crisis has swept the nation, many have begun to question the central role that courts play in battles with substance abuse.

Eldred cut to the heart of this growing debate.  The defendant, Julie Eldred, argued that requiring her to remain drug-free as a condition of probation violated her constitutional rights.  According to Eldred, addiction is a chronic brain disease that interferes with one’s ability to abstain from drugs. Eldred argued that punishing addicts like herself for a relapse punishes them for something over which they have no control and negates willfulness.  The prosecution disagreed, arguing that addiction is a condition that ranges in intensity and is responsive to penalties and rewards.  According to the prosecution, sanctions like jail time are an important tool that judges can use to encourage recovery and promote public safety.

Many of the Eldred amici weighed in on the science of addiction, focusing on the degree of control addicted individuals have over their drug use.  For instance, the Massachusetts Medical Society argued that relapse was a symptom of a disease that must be treated, not punished.  Other amici, however, pointed out that the scientific community has not yet reached consensus about whether addiction leaves someone powerless over their drug use.  The National Association of Drug Court Professionals noted that supervision and drug testing combined with graduated sanctions helps keep individuals in recovery, and cautioned the SJC against allowing “any particular theory of addiction to influence its decision.”

II. The Eldred Decision

Eldred arose out of the 10-day incarceration of Julie Eldred after she failed a court-ordered drug test.  Eldred, who had suffered from substance use disorder since age 15, had originally been convicted of larceny for stealing jewelry to support her addiction.  Eldred’s probation required her to enroll in outpatient treatment, submit to random drug screenings, and remain drug-free.  Although Eldred originally complied with her probation, enrolling in a program and starting on a course of Suboxone, she relapsed shortly thereafter and tested positive for fentanyl, a powerful opioid.  Because no inpatient drug treatment facilities had open spots, the judge overseeing Eldred’s detention hearing ordered her held in custody until one became available 10 days later.  Eldred, 480 Mass. at 93.

At the full hearing on her probation violation, Eldred argued that this 10-day detention was unlawful because her substance use disorder “rendered her incapable of remaining drug free.”  Id. at 92.  The judge disagreed, finding that Eldred had violated her probation, but nevertheless granted Eldred’s motion to report the question regarding the lawfulness of the drug-free condition to the SJC.  The SJC found that the question was improperly reported, but agreed to consider it nonetheless because it presented “issues of significant magnitude.”  Id. at 94.

Although the parties and amici focused their arguments on the addiction debate, the SJC declined to weigh in on the science.  Instead, the Eldred decision focused on a judge’s role in setting probation conditions.  Based on longstanding precedent, the SJC decided that judges may continue to require individuals to remain drug-free while on probation, and may detain individuals who violate that condition until their probation hearing.

The SJC framed the reported question in three parts.  First, when someone who is addicted to drugs commits a crime, may a judge require her to remain drug-free as a condition of probation?  Second, if an individual violates the drug-free condition, can she be subject to probation revocation proceedings?  Third, may she be held in custody while awaiting admission to an inpatient treatment facility?  Id. at 94.

The SJC answered all three questions in the affirmative.  While the Court noted that judges who deal with those who suffer from substance use disorder should act with “flexibility, sensitivity, and compassion,” the Court ruled that judges “must have the authority to detain a defendant facing a probation violation based on illicit drug use.”  Id. at 95, 99.  The Court disagreed with Eldred that the judge’s decision to detain her constituted a punishment for her relapse.  Rather, the Court likened it to a bail decision, since no final determination on whether Eldred had violated her probation had been made.  The Court noted that the judge simply sought to detain Eldred until an inpatient facility became available.  It also held that “although the appellate record before the court was inadequate to determine whether SUD affects the brain in such a way that certain individuals cannot control their drug use,” the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that there was a wilful violation of the defendant’s probation.  Id. at 104.

Finally, although the SJC agreed with Eldred that substance use disorder itself cannot be criminalized, it pointed out that “relapse is dangerous,” both for addicted individuals and the community in which they live.  Id. at 99. The Court noted that judges, who are on the front lines of the opioid epidemic, “face unresolved and constantly changing societal issues with little notice and, in many situations, without the benefit of precedential guidance.”  Id.  The Court characterized these decisions as “especially unpalatable” when an offender is addicted to drugs.  Id.  While the Court, pointing to its own Standards on Substance Abuse, acknowledged that relapse is an accepted part of recovery, the Court stressed that relapse was dangerous nonetheless, and ruled that judges must continue to have the authority to detain defendants after a relapse that violates their probationary terms.

III. Eldred’s Implications

Although Eldred maintained the status quo for judges dealing with addicted offenders, it is unlikely to be the final word on the subject.  As the opioid epidemic grows, the way we view addition is changing.  Even the Attorney General’s Office acknowledged in its briefing that “exclusively punitive responses to addiction … do not make us safer.”  While the criminal justice system may be on the front lines of the crisis for now, that role may change as other jurisdictions, legislatures, agencies, and disciplines grapple with the same questions faced in Eldred.

Martha Coakley, the first female Attorney General of Massachusetts, served from 2007-2015. Her prior experience includes District Attorney of Middlesex County; Special Attorney, Boston Organized Crime Strike Force; and Resident Fellow, Harvard Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government. Martha has been a national leader in consumer protection, and civil rights, among other areas.  As an active member and then President of the Women’s Bar Association, Martha supported and participated in the §12S petition panel for young women needing counsel in Court.  NAAG recognized her outstanding accomplishments in 2014 when she received the Kelley-Wyman Award, given annual to the AG who has done the most to achieve NAAG objectives, Martha graduated from Williams College and the Boston University School of Law. She is a Partner in Foley Hoag’s Administrative Department where she focuses on government and internal investigations, litigation, data privacy and security, and healthcare.

Rachel Hutchinson is an associate in the firm’s Administrative Law and Litigation departments, where she represents individual and corporate clients in a wide range of regulatory matters and civil disputes. Her practice focuses on regulatory compliance, government investigations, and white collar crime. Rachel also maintains a pro bono practice focused on civil rights and LGBT issues.


Understanding Expressions of Bias and Hate on Campuses Today

Garlick

by Melissa Garlick

Viewpoint

Since 2017, college and university students across the country, including in Massachusetts, have noticed their campuses papered with fliers declaring, “It’s OK to be white” – a phrase with a long history in the white supremacist movement.[1]

What may be surprising to some is that –although the seeming purpose of this coordinated effort by white supremacists is to propagandize, stoke fear, spread hate, and divide campus communities – these fliers are constitutionally protected speech.

While hate speech on campus is generally protected speech, that is not the end of the matter.  Administrators and the campus community must recognize and prepare to address the harm that can stem from such speech on campus. A clear and forceful response to constitutionally protected hate speech will prevent protected speech from escalating to bias-motivated crimes and will ensure an inclusive climate where all community members feel safe and welcome.

Free Speech vs. Hate Crimes

The flyer incidents illustrate the important –yet often overlooked – dividing lines between free speech and hate crimes. Even some of the most heinous speech is not criminal, but rather, is largely protected by federal and state constitutions. The ability to express controversial and even offensive ideas is a cornerstone of our nation’s democratic ideals; it is one of the principal ways our nation is distinguished from many countries around the globe where expression of unpopular viewpoints can be – and often is – punished.

In order for an incident to be considered a hate crime, there must be a criminal offense – designated by statute – specifically and intentionally targeting an individual or property in whole or in part because of the victim’s actual or perceived race, religion, national origin, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or disability. See e.g., M.G.L. c. 265, § 39; 18 U.S.C. § 249. Such criminal acts become hate crimes only where the perpetrator intentionally selects the victim because of the victim’s personal characteristics. Id.Even more common than hate crimes on colleges campuses, are bias incidents (also referred to as hate incidents), in which a person makes bigoted or biased comments to another individual, distributes hate literature (like the aforementioned flyers), or conducts other similar other non-verbal communication. Although they are not hate crimes and often do not violate criminal or civil law, bias incidents nonetheless can be deeply hurtful and offensive.

Hate Incidents on College/University Campuses

Every year, thousands of students are the victims of hate crimes and bias incidents on college campuses, including bias-motivated slurs, vandalism, threats, and physical assaults. According to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) statistics, schools and colleges/universities remain the third most-frequent location for hate crimes.

Over the past year, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) has tracked not only a spike in anti-Semitic and hateful incidents on campus, but has documented the changing nature of incidents and their profound impact on communities. Reports of hate rhetoric and bias incidents, including anti-Semitic and racist graffiti, extremist speakers, and racist fliers, have increased markedly. Although most of those incidents would not qualify as hate crimes or be even criminally punishable, they are deeply painful to individuals and campus communities.

For example, on Valentine’s Day in 2017, gift bags were distributed to students at a Central Michigan University student group meeting including a card that read, “my love 4 u burns like 6,000 jews” [sic] and featured a photograph of Adolf Hitler. Even though the creator/distributor of the valentine card turned out not to be a student, the impact of the incident resonated through the campus community.  University President George Ross issued a forceful statement and more than 100 faculty members issued an open letter to the University community. The letter stated: “First and foremost, we stand in unflinching solidarity with Jewish communities on our campus and beyond. We uphold you now and always. We will do everything in our power to protect you . . . .” This incident did not involve speech that crossed the First Amendment line into criminal behavior. However, the strong University response underscores the significant impact of such incidents on a person’s sense of value and belonging in a place of learning that they also call home. When hate speech appears on campus that is demeaning to a group of people and contradictory to the values of diversity and inclusion – though it may be protected by the First Amendment – trust is eroded and communities need to heal.

ADL also has tracked a dramatic uptick in incidents of white supremacists targeting college campuses via the distribution of literature, speaking engagements, or trolling/harassment efforts. Colleges and universities are traditionally seen as bastions of free speech; white supremacists capitalize on that by intentionally designing their efforts and words (e.g., the “It’s okay to be white” fliers) to fall under the umbrella of free speech. Since September 2016, ADL has tracked more than 500 incidents of white supremacist propaganda on college and university campuses, with almost 300 such incidents occurring during the 2017-18 school year. The vast majority of white supremacist campus actions involve hateful fliers (“Imagine a Muslim-Free America”) and stickers (“Make American White Again”), but white supremacists also have sent anti-Semitic faxes and delivered highly publicized on-campus speeches.

Considerations for College/University Administrators

As early as the 1600’s, John Milton introduced the now familiar concept of the “marketplace of ideas” which, in essence, posits that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.” Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting).  Yet, this marketplace is not self-executing. It depends on people’s willingness to respond to words which are intended to demean, humiliate, and deride. Educational institutions must take into account that historically marginalized and other minority groups are under a greater burden and may be unable to adequately respond when speech targets their personal identities and sense of self. It is critical that colleges and universities speak and act, both against hate and toward a civil learning environment that values inclusion, equity, and open expression.

Reporting hate crimes on campuses, for example, is a crucial part of successful prevention of hate incidents. In 1998, Congress enacted an amendment to the Higher Education Act requiring all colleges and universities that receive federal aid to collect and report hate crime statistics to the Department of Education (ED). See Clery Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (f)(1)(F). Currently, colleges and universities must report hate crime statistics for all campus crime categories.[2]

Unfortunately, however, the ED’s current hate crime statistics reflect substantial underreporting. Indeed, the majority of hate crime victimizations go unreported.[3] Colleges and universities have tended to either report the crime without indicating that it was bias-motivated or fail to report the crime at all.[4]  Such underreporting is underscored by the fact that the limited ED data conflict with campus hate crime information collected by the FBI under the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, 28 U.S.C. § 534, although the same reporting criteria apply.

Reporting hate crimes and training campus police should be a part of broader response protocols established by colleges and universities to quickly and effectively address hate crime incidents and build trust within campus communities. Campus police should take seriously all reports and allegations of hate crimes and incidents, bias, vandalism, graffiti, and flyering.

University administrators and campus stakeholders have a responsibility to use their own expressive rights to challenge and confront heinous ideas, rather than attempt to ignore them or stifle discussion. Faculty and students should be educated on the parameters of their First Amendment free speech rights and campus response policies and plans should be updated.[5]

Ultimately, the most effective responses and prevention measures by colleges and universities are those that clearly recognize the harmful impact bias incidents have on campus communities, regardless of legal distinctions between hate crimes and bias incidents. It is only through strong action and counter-messaging that trust can be maintained, communities can heal, and the rising tide of hate on campuses may be stemmed.

[1] The fliers are a byproduct of a larger trolling campaign that emerged out of 4chan, a popular internet discussion forum infamous for the studied offensiveness of many of its members and its association with the white supremacist alt-right movement. See “From 4Chan Another Trolling Campaign Emerges,” ADL, Nov. 6, 2017, available at https://www.adl.org/blog/from-4chan-another-trolling-campaign-emerges.

[2] See Clery Act Requirements, Crime Categories Covered, available at https://clerycenter.org/policy-resources/the-clery-act/.

[3] See “Majority of Hate Crime Victimizations Go Unreported to Police,” Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, June 29, 2017, available at https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/hcv0415pr.cfm.

[4] See, e.g., Rocheleau, Matt, “UNH stats showing no hate crimes in recent years raises red flag, experts say,” The Boston Globe, June 8, 2017, available at https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/06/08/unh-stats-showing-zero-hate-crimes-recent-years-raises-red-flag-experts-say/oEnPB4mYd0keau6vFpA4CP/story.html.

[5] For additional guidance, see Hate/Uncycled: ADL Resource for Administrators and Law Enforcement Teams, available at https://www.adl.org/media/11138/download (2018); Hate Crimes On Campus: The Problem and Efforts to Confront It, U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Assistance, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/187249.pdf (October 2001).

Melissa Garlick is the National Civil Rights Counsel at the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), a non-profit organization dedicated to combatting bigotry, prejudice, and anti-Semitism.  She is a member of the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Steering Committee of the BBA.


Thoughts on Some Less-Obvious Threats to Campus Free Speech

Pyle

by Jeffrey J. Pyle

Legal Analysis

Debates about free speech on campus have long centered on “speech codes”—overt policies that restrict constitutionally-protected speech deemed offensive to others. Groups such as the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), consistently oppose such policies because, in the AAUP’s words, “On a campus that is free and open, no idea can be banned or forbidden. No viewpoint or message may be deemed so hateful or disturbing that it may not be expressed.”

Speech codes, however, are not the only restraint on freedom of expression on today’s college campus. Public and private universities and state governments have adopted policies that pose a less direct but substantial threat to peaceful protest and debate on important issues. This article discusses two of them: the practice of charging student groups that invite controversial speakers to campus for security costs based on the likely reaction to the speech, and state anti-“Boycott Divestment Sanctions” legislation that applies to public universities.

  1. Security Fees Based on Likely Reaction to Speech.

In Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992), the Supreme Court struck down a Georgia county ordinance that permitted the assessment of security fees for demonstrations on public property. Under the ordinance, county administrators had discretion to impose higher fees for events featuring controversial speakers, based on the anticipated hostile reaction to the speech. This, the Court held, amounted to unconstitutional content regulation: “Speech cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob.” Id., 505 U.S. at 134-35.

In recent years, courts have applied this principle to speeches on public university campuses.  In Young America’s Foundation v. Napolitano, No. 17-CV-02255-MMC, Doc. 62 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2018), the University of California, Berkeley, billed $15,738 to a conservative group that had invited right-wing commentator Ben Shapiro to campus, allegedly to cover necessary security for the event. The relevant university policy adhered to Forsyth’s directive that the amount of the fee cannot be based on the likely reaction of hecklers. However, Berkeley failed to explain why it charged three times as much for Shapiro as it had charged for a different high-profile speaker, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sonya Sotomayor. Accordingly, the Court denied Berkeley’s motion to dismiss the as-applied First Amendment challenge to the fee assessed on the conservative group.

Private universities, of course, are not legally bound by the First Amendment, but they still face the important policy question of whether to pass security costs onto organizers of campus events. Significant security costs will often be unaffordable to student groups, and a policy imposing them can sometimes work to prevent the exchange of ideas on campus. Such fee policy may also embolden persons seeking to shut down speech through threats of violence, thereby perpetuating the “heckler’s veto.” Accordingly, even private universities should craft their policies on this subject with regard for their impact on First Amendment principles.

  1. Anti-“Boycott Divestment Sanctions” Statutes

The First Amendment includes the right to organize boycotts that are intended to change government policy. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (holding that boycotts intended to “influence governmental action” are protected under the First Amendment). However, according to the National Coalition Against Censorship, at least 17 states have passed statutes that seek to penalize those who join the “Boycott Divestment Sanctions” (“BDS”) campaign, a movement that seeks to influence Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians through economic pressure. A Texas statute, for example, provides that any company wishing to contract with the state must certify that it “does not boycott Israel,” and will not do so during the term of the contract. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2270.001 et seq.

The provisions of state anti-BDS statutes differ, but they generally apply by their terms to public universities, as to any other state institution. Last year, the University of Houston required an external speaker to pledge she would not support BDS before she could be paid for conducting a workshop on campus. She refused, and an administrator faked her signature to process payment. (The administrator later resigned.)

Anti-BDS statutes are of doubtful constitutionality even outside academia. Koontz v. Watson, C.A. No. 17-4099-DDC-KGS, Doc. 15 (D. Kan. Jan. 30, 2018) (issuing preliminary injunction against Kansas anti-BDS statute). Within the academy, their application would frustrate the free interchange of ideas by depriving students of the ability to hear speakers—on any subject—who happen to support the BDS movement, or who on principle object to signing pledges as a condition of speaking. The AAUP recently released a statement condemning any requirement that academic speakers sign anti-BDS pledges, while reiterating its opposition to all academic boycotts, including those against Israel. At the very least, states with such laws on the books should clarify that they have no application in the academic context.

*      *      *

To protect free speech on campus, universities must do more than foreswear speech codes. They must also ensure that other policies governing campus life do not impinge on the interchange of ideas “that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.”  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–09 (1969).

Jeffrey J. Pyle is a partner in the Media and First Amendment Practice Group at Prince Lobel Tye, LLP in Boston, Massachusetts.  As a high school student, Jeffrey and his brother brought a successful challenge to his school district’s speech code.  Pyle v. School Committee of South Hadley, 423 Mass. 283 (1996).